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Abstract:  Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. We 
study this question through notarial acts on public slave auctions in Mauritius 
between 1825 and 1835, involving 4,286 slaves. In addition to slave characteristics, 
the acts document the identities of buyers and sellers. We use this information to 
determine whether the buyer of a slave was related (e.g. a relative or a spouse) to 
the original slave owner, and thus most likely better–informed than other bidders. 
Auction–theoretic models predict that bidding should be more aggressive when 
informed bidders are present in open–bids, ascending auctions, such as slave 
auctions. By proxying informed bidders by related bidders, our results consistently 
indicate that this is the case, pointing toward presence of residual adverse selection 
in the market for slaves in Mauritius. 
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Résumé: La présence d’antisélection dans les marchés d’esclaves demeure une 
question ouverte. Nous analysons cette énigme en utilisant des actes notariés de 
vente d’esclaves à des enchères publiques à l’Île Maurice entre 1825 et 1835, 
impliquant 4 286 esclaves. En plus de documenter des caractéristiques des 
esclaves, les actes donnent de l’information sur l’identité des vendeurs et des 
acheteurs. Nous utilisons cette information afin de déterminer si l’acheteur d’un 
esclave avait des liens (marital ou autre) avec le propriétaire de l’esclave et 
possédait ainsi plus d’information que les autres participants à l’enchère. La théorie 
des enchères prédit que les mises devraient être plus agressives lorsque des 
participants mieux informés sont présents dans des enchères ouvertes ascendantes, 
comme l’étaient les enchères d’esclaves. En utilisant les liens avec l’ancien 
propriétaire pour définir les participants les mieux informés, nos résultats indiquent 
qu’il existait de l’antisélection résiduelle dans le marché des esclaves à l’Île Maurice 
durant la période étudiée. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Issues and motivation
According to Akerlof (1970) adverse selection should be anticipated when four conditions are
present. First, one party to the sale should be more informed than the other. Second, the
quality of the product or service being sold should be valuable to both parties. Third, price
should not be set by the more informed party. Finally, uncertainty should not be completely
dissipated by extra-trading arrangements, such as warranties or litigation practices.
Based on these characteristics, the market for slaves would certainly satisfy the necessary
conditions for adverse selection. Buying a slave remained a risky investment in which the buyer
was at an informational disadvantage compared to the seller (Fede, 1987; Wahl, 1996). First,
a slave-owner would undoubtedly have had more time to assess the productive abilities of a
given slave.1 Second, with the exception of slaves bought for manumission, the vast majority
of slaves that were sold went from one productive activity to another. Unless involving an
important change of type of work (e.g. from field hand to skilled work), sellers and buyers
would presumably value the same characteristics. Third, slaves were usually sold in competitive
auction markets (Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991), thereby limiting the scope for market
manipulation by informed sellers. Finally, although much more complex than commercial law,
the law governing slave sales was generally unable to eliminate the negative effects of information
asymmetry completely (Wahl, 1996).
Unfortunately, empirical evaluation of adverse selection in any market is not guided by
clear theoretical prescriptions; although intuitively appealing, the Akerlof conditions for adverse
selection to be present are difficult to assess in practice (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2000, p. 57).
1Although professional slave traders might not have had this informational advantage, the usually long periods
between taking charge of a slave and final sale would have given them time to assess temperament, propensity
to flee, resistance to illness, . . . . For example, Freudenberger and Pritchett (1991) estimate a modal duration of
two to three months for interstate trade toward the New Orleans market.
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One approach proposed by Genesove (1993) is that the intensity of the marginal propensity
to sell should be inversely related to adverse selection. Hence, a seller with surplus holdings
of a good for which he has little alternative uses should sell all of his stocks, good and bad
quality alike. Conversely, a seller with alternative uses, and little surplus, should sell only the
low-quality goods, keeping the high-quality ones for himself. To the extent that observable
characteristics of the seller provide information as to which case applies, the culling behavior
of the latter is anticipated by the market, and a discount is imposed to the goods he sells.
Applications of this framework are found in the markets for used cars (Genesove, 1993), for
thoroughbred yearlings (Chezum and Wimmer, 1997) or for displaced workers (Gibbons and
Katz, 1991).
On the basis of similar tests, although adverse selection is likely to have been present in
slave markets, the empirical evidence concerning its incidence remains inconclusive. On the
one hand, Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) contend that adverse selection was empirically
important. Studying the New Orleans market for local and imported slaves they rely on the
origin of the slave as observable seller characteristic to gauge the degree of adverse selection.
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) conjecture that owners from low-productivity areas (e.g. Old
South, or Border States) had a higher marginal propensity to sell and therefore no interest
in keeping only the best slaves and selling the low-quality ones. In comparison, owners from
high-productivity Louisiana would cull bad slaves for resale purposes. Consequently, prices
for imported slaves in the New Orleans market would be higher than for local slaves. Their
empirical results confirm this intuition. Similarly, Choo and Eid (2004) find that they cannot
reject the null hypothesis of low–productivity slaves culling from high-productivity suppliers
of slaves to the New Orleans market, even controlling for unobservable variables, such as the
number of bidders.
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However, Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) criticize this conjecture that higher imported
slave prices reflected adverse selection. First, they argue that one setting in which adverse
selection ought to be minimized was during estate sales where assets (including slaves) were
liquidated following the death of the owner. In comparison, voluntary sales should be more
subject to bad slaves culling and therefore lower prices. Yet, they find no statistically significant
difference between prices observed during estate and voluntary sales. Secondly, they suggest
an alternative explanation for the difference in the prices of imported versus local slaves. If
a fixed transportation cost is applied to an imported slave, irrespective of its quality, and if
prices are positively related to quality, then clearly the relative prices of the high-quality slave
decrease with respect to that of the inferior one. Slave buyers would therefore have responded
to this fall in the relative price of high-quality slaves by demanding more of them (Pritchett
and Freudenberger, 1992; Pritchett and Chamberlain, 1993). That imported slaves to the New
Orleans market would fetch higher prices simply reflected the fact that they were of higher
quality compared to local slaves, instead of being the result of an adverse selection discount
applied against local sellers.
Hence, the debate on the presence of adverse selection on slave markets remains unresolved.
Whether or not adverse selection was indeed present is of importance to the extent that not
taking it into account may bias evaluations of the profitability of slavery. In particular, it
would prove hazardous to infer the productive capacity of the general slave population from
market prices of slaves if these were actually inferior ones culled by their owners (e.g Greenwald
and Glasspiegel, 1983; Choo and Eid, 2004, among others). In light of these elements, this
paper’s objectives are to propose another look at whether or not adverse selection affected slave
markets. We depart from previous analysis in at least three important ways. First, we focus
on a slave market which has received comparatively less attention: that of early Nineteenth
century Mauritius. Second, we analyze adverse selection from a different perspective drawing
3
from an auction–theoretic background. Finally, we resort to a rigorous estimation and inference
framework to gauge the importance of adverse selection. The proposed methodology should
be useful to the analysis of residual asymmetric information in different applications of English
auctions and possibly others.
1.2 Methodology and results overview
Although Mauritius remained an important slave colony of the French, and, beginning in 1810,
of the British, until slavery was finally abolished in 1835, Mauritian slavery has not been as
extensively studied as its American counterparts.2 Despite distance, Chenny et al. (2003) show
that Mauritian slavery displayed remarkable parallels with its better–known counterparts else-
where. Valuation of physical strength, skills, and reproductive capacities were just as prevalent
as those found in the Americas (Mancall et al., 2001; Bergad et al., 1995; Newland and San
Segundo, 1996; Kotlikoff, 1979, 1992, among others). On the other hand, compared to the New
Orleans market, the Mauritian slave market can safely be regarded as purely local. A small
island of 720 square miles, slave imports were effectively banned by the British. The implica-
tions are that difference in prices between slaves could not be attributed to differences in quality
induced by transportation costs, thereby addressing the critique by Pritchett and Chamberlain
(1993).
The problem of adverse selection should be market–, and not location–specific. If the char-
acteristics of the slave market are such as to give rise to adverse selection, and if those character-
istics are similar across geographical locations, then adverse selection should also be prevalent
in the Mauritian market. In order to study this question, we augment and complement the
database introduced by Chenny et al. (2003). This database initially consisted of detailed no-
2It is estimated that 85% of its population of 78,000 were slaves in 1807. See Burroughs (1976), Benedict
(1980), Nwulia (1981) Barker (1996), Teelock (1998), Scarr (1998), Valentine (2000), and Allen (1999, 2001) for
historical and sociological discussions and bibliographies on Mauritian slavery in particular. See Clarence-Smith
(1989); Scarr (1998) for discussions of the Indian Ocean slave trade in general.
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tarial acts on auction sales of slaves over the period 1825–1827. In Section 2 we extend the
period covered to include the years up to 1835, for a total of 580 auctions involving over 4,200
slaves. Our database includes detailed information on slaves’ characteristics (ethnicity, gen-
der, age, skills, bundle composition). Importantly, it also contains transactional data on the
motivation for the sale, as well as on the identities of the seller and buyer. This allows us to
differentiate between voluntary and involuntary (i.e. succession, bankruptcy) sales. Moreover,
a careful analysis of the notarial acts allows us to gauge the degree of parental relationship
between the seller and buyer. This variable is a key ingredient of our empirical evaluation of
adverse selection.
Heuristically, it may be argued that close parental (or business) relationship with the owner
could lead to more and better information on the slave’s characteristics. Furthermore, if we take
into account the fact that the Mauritian market was local, and that auctions were publicized
well in advance, it appears reasonable to suppose that these seller–bidder ties would have been
public information. Observing that someone who was related to the original owner was bidding
for a slave at the auction could signal to the market that this particular slave was of high
quality. Clearly, a related bidder could also try to acquire the slaves for other, more personal
reasons that are unrelated to a slave’s productive characteristics (e.g, personal attachment,
manumission purposes, . . . ). In the former case, competitive bidding should have been more
aggressive, in the latter, it should not have been affected by the related bidder’s participation.
Put differently, the informational asymmetry with respect to a slave characteristic valued by all
bidders (common value) should have been reflected in a slave’s price. Information asymmetry
related to a slave’s characteristic valued only by a particular bidder (private value) should not.
In light of these elements, this paper departs from standard literature in resorting to a
demand–related, instead of supply–related (i.e. through marginal propensity to sell) empirical
characterization of adverse selection. We use the interdependence of bidding behavior in public
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auctions where information is asymmetric, and where the good being auctioned has a common
and private value to construct our empirical test. In this setup, the bidding behavior of certain
bidders considered to be better informed affects that of others who infer the quality of the
good from the actions of the formers. The auctions literature described in Section 3.1 has long
recognized that this environment is well suited for the analysis of adverse selection (e.g Milgrom,
2004; Maskin, 2004, among others).
We consequently resort to a well-known theoretical model of English auctions in Section 3.2.
The framework, developed by Wilson (1998) and extended by Hong and Shum (2003), considers
open–bid ascending auctions with informational asymmetries among bidders, private and com-
mon valuation, and is particularly appropriate for the analysis of slave markets. Importantly,
the Wilson (1998) model derives closed–form solutions for the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium bids
under log-normal distributions for values and signals. We can adapt this model to our particular
setting by characterizing an informed (related) bidder as one with a perfect signal on the slave’s
common value, but nonetheless valuing the slave for personal motives as well. In the Wilson
(1998) model, individual signals and valuations are not observed, but distributional assumptions
governing those are public information. This means that the identity of the informed bidder
would be known, as was likely the case in our setting.
Although analytical expressions for the equilibrium bidding strategies are derived, the exact
role of the informed–bidder assumption is difficult to extract. We therefore resort to numerical
analysis in Section 3.3. Using Monte–Carlo experiments, we compute the ex-post distribution
of equilibrium bids for a large parameter space and taking into account parametric uncertainty.
Our results indicate a clear and intuitively–appealing outcome: the presence of the informed
bidder leads to systematically more aggressive bidding (Claim 1). When the informed bidder
exits the auction, the market interprets this as a bad signal on the auctioned good’s common
value, and bids fall accordingly, until this effect is eventually subsumed by the additional in-
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formation revealed in subsequent bidding rounds. As we increase the uncertainty regarding the
share of total valuation of the informed bidder attributed to personal motives, the bid premium
is reduced, but remains nonetheless positive. Hence the auction–theoretical model result re-
veal that bids (and consequently) prices should be higher when an informed bidder is present.
Importantly, the informed bidder ends up paying a higher equilibrium price in those instances
where he does win the auction (Claim 2).
In our case, we attribute more information to personal seller–bidder ties and associate an in-
formed bidder with a related bidder. Our data set does not contain information on all instances
where related bidders participated in slave auctions. However, we observe cases where related
bidders made the winning bid, and subsequently recorded the sale with the notary. It is thus
unlikely that these sales were motivated by market manipulation objectives from those entitled
to the proceeds of the auction. Hence, testing Claim 2 is tantamount to testing whether slave
prices were effectively higher when a related buyer ended up buying the slave. Consequently,
in Section 4.1 we specify an hedonic pricing econometric model of log prices, with slave char-
acteristics (ethnicity, age, skills, presence of children in bundle, and gender) as well as seasonal
and time dummies as control variables. We augment the specification with a binary variable for
the buyer being related to the original owner. We interpret a positive premium on this variable
as indicating the presence of informational asymmetries in general, and adverse selection in
particular.
The estimated parameters presented in Section 4.2 all have the desired signs: prices are
higher for ethnic groups considered more productive, are bell-shaped in age, increase in skills
and presence of children and in peak sugar cane production seasons and years. Whether or
not we control for potential endogeneity in the related–buyer variable, or the fact that it is a
discrete variable confirms our theoretical result: the premium on the related buyer is positive,
indicating that the null hypothesis of no adverse selection is rejected. Moreover, we draw from
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the literature on testing for adverse selection in insurance markets to verify the robustness of our
results. Adapting a result from Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) amounts to testing for conditional
covariances between prices and decision of related buyers to purchase the slave. Once again, our
empirical results confirm that the null of no adverse selection is rejected. Finally, we consider
a parametric implementation suggested by Dionne et al. (2001) controlling for potential mis-
specification of the econometric model. Again we reject the null of no adverse selection. Overall,
our tests consistently indicate that adverse selection was present in Mauritian slave markets.
2 Data
The information on the sale of Mauritian slaves is obtained from the notarial acts in the General
Inventory of Notaries (group NA), from the Mauritius Archives located in Coromandel, Mau-
ritius. Under Mauritian colonial law, notaries played a key role in the public auctions of slaves
(Government of Mauritius, 1824, Proclamation of July 16, pp 122–125). In particular, notaries
certified the ownership titles of the sellers, recorded the list of slave characteristics, as well as
the motivation for the sale. They subsequently publicized and organized the public auction.
Finally, the notaries recorded transactional information between the seller and the buyer of the
slave, including the price and observable characteristics of the slave, as well as the name of the
buyer. In what follows, we focus exclusively on sales conducted through public auctions, and
abstract from private person–to–person sales for which we have no information.
We build on the database first introduced by Chenny et al. (2003) who used the notarial acts
for 1825 to 1827. They considered a sample of 152 auctions involving the sale of close to 1,300
slaves. We extend the period covered up to January 1835, for a total of 580 auctions involving
4,286 slaves. Even though other auctions were also held over that period, slaves were actually
sold only during those auctions in our sample. These sales were recorded in the notarial acts
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of fifteen notaries described in Table 1. Most were operating from the capital, Port-Louis. One
notary, Alexandre Bonnefin, accounts for 26% of all auctions and 20% of all slaves sold during
the whole period. Three notaries were active up to 1829 and we found no record of sales which
they would have performed afterwards.
The slave’s gender was recorded either explicitly or implicitly. For example, the acts written
in French distinguish between vendu (male) and vendue (female). Moreover, a slave’s age, and
ethnicity were also reported. Following contemporaneous descriptions, slaves’ ethnic groups
were classified as Creoles (born on the island), Malagasy, Mozambiques, and Indians (including
Malays). Table 2 verifies our sample’s representativeness of the slave population in Mauritius by
comparing it with the 1826 partial census data from the Greffe de l’Enregistrement des Esclaves
in the Mauritius Archives Teelock (1998); Valentine (2000). Overall, gender, ethnic, as well as
the average age distributions by ethnic group in our sample are quite close to those obtained
from the census. We therefore conclude that our sample is reasonably representative of the
general slave population.
We use the occupational classification of Telfair (1830) to characterize a slave’s work. We
aggregate the slaves’ occupations into three categories: laborers, agriculture and sea-related;
household slaves; and skilled slaves (see the notes to Table 3 for a more complete description).
Table 3 reports the average prices across gender, occupation and ethnic group. Our main
findings may be summarized as follows: (i) female slaves consistently fetched lower prices; (ii)
price differences across ethnic groups are significant, with Creoles fetching the highest prices;
and (iii) premiums are associated with skilled occupations. These findings are consistent with
those of Chenny et al. (2003) for the period 1825–1827.
Slaves on the secondary market were either sold voluntarily by their masters, or sold in-
voluntarily following their owner’s bankruptcy or death (succession sales). Under the French
Civil Code (adapted for Mauritius under Code Decaen, 1804), following a bankruptcy, all the
9
assets (including slaves) of the individual or company had to be liquidated through an auction.
Succession laws (also specified in the Civil Code) prescribed that the succession should be di-
vided among heirs following the death of the owner(s). Complete liquidation of assets through
an auction was automatic whenever a heir was minor, absent or legally ineligible. Similarly,
auction sales would have been organized whenever heirs failed to reach an agreement concerning
the valuation and distribution of the assets among themselves. In this case, the value of the
proceeds from the auction would have been divided among the heirs.
When the reason for the auction could not be obtained from the notarial acts, either because
it was not documented or the reason was illegible because of the poor quality of some documents,
the motivation for the sale was classified as unknown. In Table 4, the vast majority (77%) of
auctions took place to liquidate the estate of a deceased person, while only 9% were because
a slave owner voluntarily wanted to sell his or her slaves. The remainder auctions occurred
because of bankruptcy.
Table 5 uses the motivation for sales to compare the prices of succession versus voluntary
sales. To ensure homogeneity of the slaves, we focus on a sub-sample of males, and prime-aged
field hands. The results indicate a substantial and significant 45% premium for the latter when
sold in succession rather than in voluntary sales. This premium could be interpreted as prima
facie evidence of adverse selection.3 However, it could also be related to the different types of
buyers involved in both type of sales, an issue to which we now turn.
3Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) argue that it is unlikely that succession sales were motivated by hidden
defects of the slaves. The death of the owner is a random event, uncorrelated with the quality of his slaves.
As such, succession sales would probably be the least subject to adverse selection, and the price would be more
closely aligned with the productive capacities inferred from the slave’s observable characteristics. In comparison,
slave owners should be inclined to voluntarily sell slaves with unobservable defects (propensity to flee, to illness,
low work intensity, . . . ). Contrary to a succession, voluntary sales did not involve the forced liquidation of all
assets. Only slaves with bad qualities might therefore have been brought to the auction, with better ones retained
by the owners. This suggests that adverse selection would have been the most severe in voluntary sales and the
least severe in succession sales. Consequently, slaves sold voluntarily should fetch lower prices than those who
are sold during succession sales.
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Finally, our data allows us to determine whether or not buyers and sellers are related. Each
notarial act gives the name of the person who initiated the sale, the name of the original owner,
and the name(s) of the buyer(s). In the case of succession sales, each notarial act also lists
the name of all the heirs, as well as any other individual who is entitled to some part of the
proceeds of the sale.4 For example, on July 2nd 1826, notary Dubor (NA 63) auctioned the
estate of deceased sieur Deville, a police commissioner (Commissaire civil et de police) in the
town of Pamplemousses located to the North of Mauritius. Sylvain Chauveau, the testament
executor, is recorded as the seller. The estate consisted of 12 slaves: 2 mothers with their
children (1 and 3 in each case), 2 skilled males (cook and carpenter), 2 female laundresses, 1
female seamstress, and 1 female domestic worker. All the slaves, except the cook Caramouche
and the female domestic worker Zaize, were purchased by the wife of the deceased sieur Deville.
The widow is obviously related with the original slave owner. Caramouche was purchased by
Hypolite Dupery for whom we could not find any link with either sieur Deville or anyone else
mentioned in the notarial act. As for Zaize, she was purchased by G. Deville. Although the
latter has the same last name as the deceased, he is not mentioned anywhere in the notarial
archive as being related to the deceased slave owner. We code such a sale as the buyer and
sellers having the same names and being possibly related.5
We repeated the above procedure for each slave. Given that mothers were sold together
with their younger children under Code Noir, and that we exclude voluntary bundling of slaves,
we are left with 3,307 sales. The distribution of the potential link between the buyer and seller
is reported in Table 6. We find a link between buyers and sellers for 1,003 slaves. In the case of
succession sales, conditional on having a relationship with the deceased person, the widow(er)
is the modal buyer. The second group of related buyers is composed of the former owner’s
4This would be the case for example if there was any creditor.
5For robustness reasons, we also assumed that individuals with the same last name were unrelated, without
any qualitative change in our results.
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children. The share of related buyers is lower in the case of bankruptcies (4.6%) or voluntary
sales (12.6%) than succession sales (38.5%). In the case of voluntary sales, the modal related
buyer is the original owner himself (15 purchases).6 Overall, this confirms our earlier conjecture
that the type of buyers involved in voluntary versus involuntary slave auctions differed. We now
address the issue of how these differences might have affected the bidding process and eventually
the sale price.
3 Theoretical analysis
As mentioned in Section 2, we can distinguish two types of buyers: related and unrelated.
Regarding the formers, we make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 Compared to other bidders, a related bidder has superior information on un-
observable characteristic(s) of a slave correlated with the slave’s common value.
Assumption 2 A related bidder’s identity is known by other bidders.
The first assumption appears realistic. We saw in Table 6 that the vast majority of related
buyers were either the spouse or children of the deceased owner in succession sales. It would
seem natural to suppose that these bidders would have had sufficient time to acquire privileged
information on the slave being auctioned. The second assumption is also reasonable. The small
size of the Mauritian market, both in the limited number of participants, and geographical
concentration would make it likely that bidders would have known each other.
Observing that a related buyer remains active in the bidding process signals to others that
this slave has value. On the one hand, if this value is purely private, it is useless to others,
and their bidding strategy should remain unaffected. On the other, if this value is common,
6Note that, as was the case in New Orleans (Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991), the original owner could buy
back his own slaves. These owners may have decided to buy back the slave given that the proposed bid was less
than their reservation value.
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the related bidder’s actions are useful to the others; they revise upwards their conditional
beliefs as long as the related bidder remains active in the bidding process. If at the end of the
bidding process the related buyer acquires the slave, and if other bidders believe his actions are
motivated by a high common value, then the price paid by the related buyer will be higher,
reflecting the informational asymmetry, and adverse selection risk. Clearly if information is
perfectly symmetric across bidders, and/or if the slave’s value to the related bidder is purely
private, the latter’s actions should be inconsequential.7 In order to characterize better how these
effects impact the equilibrium bidding process, we now turn to auction models. One setting
which is particularly well-suited for our analysis is the open–bid, ascending English auction
model with private and common value, and informational asymmetry across bidders.
3.1 Auctions models
An auction is characterized by a group of potential bidders that compete for the acquisition of
goods. We limit the discussion to a single good auction because we analyze such auction in the
empirical part of the article. An auction of interest for our purpose is the English or ascending
auction with a sequential bidding game where the highest bid wins. When there is a single
good, this auction with only private values generates an efficient allocation in the sense that
the bidder with the highest type always win. As shown by Vickrey (1961), the English and the
second price auction yield the same payoffs under the above assumptions.
One limitation of this environment with only private values is that the payoffs of potential
bidders are not dependent of other bidders’ presence. In other words, the assumption of private
values does not consider that others’ information can influence a participant ranking of values
or does not allow for interdependent (or common) values. An environment with interdepen-
7Note that the relationship between a seller and a related bidder raises a possibility of market manipulation.
For instance, a group of heirs might collude to simulate interest in a particular slave so as to raise prices, dropping
out of the auction process at the last moment. In our setting however, the market manipulation argument does
not apply since the related buyer actually ended up purchasing the slave.
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dence is often identified as containing potential adverse selection (or asymmetric information)
because the final outcome may be function of the information of certain bidders that affects the
information of other bidders. In other words, bidders can learn something about the quality
of the good during the bidding period that can change their reservation prices (Milgrom, 2004;
Maskin, 2004). It is natural to believe that oral English auctions may introduce interdependence
in individual values.
In presence of interdependent or common values, the analysis of efficiency is more com-
plicated. However, Maskin (1992) and Krishna (2003) show that an equilibrium, with one-
dimensional signals, can still be efficient in ascending auctions with interdependent values and
asymmetric bidders (different value functions) if interpersonal crossing conditions hold. When
signals are multidimensional, efficiency is no longer possible (for a general proof of inefficiency
see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001)).
Krishna (2003), as for many authors in this literature, considers a specific case of English
auctions. This version of the English auction is labelled as the Japanese auction or the button
auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). In this auction, when a bidder decides to drop out, his
decision is both public and irrevocable. We shall consider this auction type in the reminder
of the discussion. One important contribution for empirical studies on auctions with private
and common components is that of Wilson (1998). He assumes that values are distributed
log normally and asymmetric bidders have multiplicative value functions. In that setting the
equilibrium strategies are log-linear and can be computed in function of the chosen parameters.
Krishna (2003) shows that Wilson model satisfy the crossing conditions with N bidders, so
the obtained sequential equilibria are efficient even in asymmetric auctions. Finally, Hong and
Shum (2003) extend the Wilson model by relaxing the perfectly diffuse prior assumption for the
common value. They also allow the bidders to observe only a single signal that corresponds to
the product of the private component and the noisy estimate of the common component.
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As already mentioned, in this article, we analyze the selling of slaves in small communities
where potential buyers know other buyers and where one bidder can be a family member of the
past owner of the slave in the auction. The auction model that corresponds to our empirical
test is related to open ascending auctions. The monetary value of the item is the sum of
two components: A common component having a common value to all bidders and a private
component having an idiosyncratic value. For our purpose the common component can be
interpreted as the productivity of the slave and the private component corresponds to any other
quality of the slave that matters for a potential buyer such as his personality. The two values
are independent random variables.
The theoretical setting allows for asymmetric auctions where all bidders differ in the precision
of their signals on private and common values. What we test for is a special case of that
asymmetry in which one related bidder (the insider) has better information on the common
value. We label this case as asymmetric information.
In our framework, the common value is assumed to be better known by only one bidder
identified as the insider who may be a member of the family that owned the slave before the
auction. The auctioneer does not know the common value so she cannot reveal it to the outsiders
or all other bidders. The insider can be identified and other bidders know that the insider has
private information about the common component of the slave.
Two information cases are of interest for the empirical test. The first one, common knowl-
edge, is when none of the bidders has better information on the common value. The second case
will be identified as the residual asymmetric information one. By definition, this case occurs
when the observable insider does not want to or cannot credibly reveal his perfect informa-
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tion about the common value of the slave during the auction. This case is possible in small
communities where all bidders know each other as in our application.8
One prediction from the model presented in the next section is that the expected price
conditional on the insider winning the auction in the residual asymmetric information case
is higher than in the case where the insider does not win the auction. When there is no
residual asymmetric information, such as in the common knowledge case, there should not
be any correlation between the winning price and the fact that the insider wins the auction.
By symmetry, this last result should be the same when no participant knows the common
value (hidden knowledge) because the analytical models are very similar (Hernando-Veciana
and Tro¨ge, 2004).
Our empirical proposition for the presence of residual asymmetric information means that
when the insider remains in the dynamic auction, this increases some outsiders’ incentives to
do so. These outsiders are willing to outbid any insider’s bid, even bids above their expected
value. The reason is that such outsiders may find it profitable to win at any price at which the
insider does so. This situation is a consequence of the interplay between the winner’s and the
loser’s curse.
To see intuitively the effect of presence of asymmetric information, consider Figure 1 bor-
rowed from an example in Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2004). The figure compares the out-
siders’ bid function bi in the common knowledge (CK) structure for a given realization of the
common value (v) to that in the residual asymmetric information one (AI). The bid functions
are increasing in the private values ai. In this auction the insider has an incentive to remain
active as long as the price has not reached his true value. In the common knowledge case,
the outsider with type ai leaves the auction at price (ai + v)/2. Under residual asymmetric
8It is also probable in auctions of fine arts or in auctions for the selling of fishes when experts are present. Of
course an art collector or a fish expert can be represented by an anonymous bidder but such substitution is less
possible in slaves auctions that are regulated and where all transactions have to be registered with notary acts.
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information, the behavior of the outsider is function of the insider’s behavior. One can show
that the outsider will leave the auction at price ai if the insider has not leaved the auction yet
and at (ai + v)/2 if the insider has left the auction at price v.
We observe in Figure 1 that if the insider remains in the auction, the outsiders with high
types or high private values continue to bid at higher values in the asymmetric information
case than in the common knowledge case. The opposite situation is observed for outsiders with
low types. So when outsiders have high private values, the probability to have a winner’s curse
(“the insider knows that the common value is less than what the outsider thought”) is low and
that to have a loser’s curse (“the insider knows that the common value is larger than what
the outsider thought”) is high. Consequently, when the number of bidders is sufficiently large
to have bidders with high private values in the auction, outsiders with high private values will
have higher incentives to remain active in the auction under asymmetric information than in the
auction with common knowledge because they bid as they have good news about the common
value to protect themselves against the loser’s curse.
In this environment with residual asymmetric information, if the insider has high private
and common values and wants to buy the slave, the observed winning price will be higher when
the insider wins than when he does not win. In the common knowledge case however, the fact
that the insider wins is independent of the common value. We now present a more formal
discussion of the above conclusion.
3.2 Closed-form Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bids
The structure of the Wilson (1998), and Hong and Shum (2003) model of English auctions is the
following. Agents denoted i = 1, . . . , N are characterized by a valuation (common and private)
Vi and a signal (valuation plus noise) Xi concerning an object sold at an ascending, open–bid
auction. Each round of auction consists in agents submitting bids, with the lowest bid being
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dropped out and a new round being started. At each round k, agents can observe the signal of
the exiting bidder, but need to infer that of the N − k other bidders who remain active. Given
price P , the equilibrium bidding strategy of agent i at bid round k, βki , must satisfy:
P = E[Vi | X1 = (β
k
1 )
−1(P ), . . . ,XN−k = (β
k
N−k)
−1(P ),XN−k+1, . . . ,XN ], (1)
for i = 1, . . . N − k. Under general monotonicity conditions, it can be shown that such an equi-
librium exists and is obtained by solving (1) for the N−k inverse bidding functions (βkN−k)
−1(P )
(Hong and Shum, 2003, Proposition 1, p. 331).
Importantly, Wilson (1998) and Hong and Shum (2003) derive closed-form expressions for
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding functions when the stochastic process is log-normal. In
particular, assume that (log) valuation vi ≡ log(Vi) and (log) signal xi ≡ log(Xi) are distributed
as follows:
vi = ai + v (2)
ai = a¯i + ǫai , ǫai ∼ N.I.D.(0, t
2
i ) (3)
v = m+ ǫv, ǫv ∼ N.I.D.(0, r
2
0) (4)
xi = vi + ǫxi , ǫxi ∼ N.I.D.(0, s
2
i ). (5)
The valuation for each agent vi is the sum of an idiosyncratic private value ai and a common
value v; ti is the standard error of the private value, and r0 that of the common value. The
idiosyncratic signal xi is given by the individual value plus an idiosyncratic noise term ǫxi with
standard error si varying across agents.
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Under the log-normal assumptions, the equilibrium bid of agent i at round k satisfies:
bki ≡ log(β
k
i ) = 1/A
k
i (xi +D
k
i x
k
d + C
k
i ), (6)
where xkd is the ex-post observable vector of signals from exited bidders, and where A
k
i ,D
k
i , C
k
i
are functions of the distributional parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si (Hong and Shum, 2003, eq. (12),
p. 334).9 The main difference between Wilson (1998) and Hong and Shum (2003) is that the
former assumes a perfectly diffuse prior on the common value corresponding to r0 =∞, whereas
the latter do not.
This model is well-suited to analyze the impact of the presence of an informed bidder on
equilibrium bids. In particular, we can rewrite the signal function (5) as:
xi = (a¯i + ǫai) + (v + siξi), ξi ∼ N.I.D.(0, 1). (7)
Hence, the signal is the sum of a noisy private component (a¯i + ǫai), and a noisy estimate of
the common value (v + siξi). In this light, an informed bidder, i = I, could be thought of as
one whose signal on the common value is precise compared to others:10
si =


0, if i = I,
> 0 otherwise.
(8)
Hence, the signal on the common value to an informed bidder is the common value itself. The
overall signal xI in (7) however remains noisy since it incorporates a noisy private signal as well.
9For completeness, we reproduce the closed-form expressions for Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i in the Appendix.
10Recall that because the distributional parameters a¯i, ti, m, r0, si are known, this implies that the identity of
the informed bidder is also known by other bidders
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An analytical evaluation of the effect of restriction (8) is complicated by the nonlinearities
in the distributional parameters found in Aki ,D
k
i , C
k
i . Alternatively, we may resort to numerical
approaches to which we now turn.
3.3 A Monte-Carlo Experiment
We conduct a Monte-Carlo experiment to analyze the impact of the informed bidder restriction
(8) on the equilibrium bids (6). Specifically, we select a number of participants (N = 30);
distribution laws for the fixed parameters (U(0, 1)); and a number of iterations (T = 5000). In
accordance with the model, the error terms are drawn from Gaussian distributions. Then, at
each iteration j = 1, . . . T we:
1. generate the fixed parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si from U(0, 1);
2. generate the errors process ǫai , ǫv, ǫxi from a Gaussian distribution corresponding to the
generated scedastic structure in step 1;
3. use (6) to compute the equilibrium bids for each bidder i, at each round k, and for each
iteration j, first without b0(i, k, j), and then with an informed bidder b1(i, k, j).
Finally, we compute the informed bidder premium π defined as difference between all agents’
bids with and without informed bidder:
π(i, k, j) ≡ b1(i, k, j) − b0(i, k, j), ∀i, k = 1, . . . N (9)
In what follows, we focus on the median premium πˆ(i, k) ≡ Median(π(i, k, :)) to obtain the
desired prediction for the empirical part of our study.
The number of participants is set at 30, a reasonable figure for Mauritian slave auctions.
Moreover, the parameters of the model are generated at each iteration. This ensures that our
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results are not dependent on a specific parameter set, but are robust to very general parametric
specifications. In addition, we resort to variance reduction techniques (antithetic variates) to
augment precision, such that our results actually correspond to a much larger than the (already
large) number of replications. Also, the identity of the informed bidder is arbitrarily chosen such
that he sometimes wins the auction, and sometimes doesn’t. Finally, we check for the robustness
of our results by sequentially changing the number of participants, and the distributional laws
for the fixed distribution parameters.
Figure 2 plots the median premium πˆ(i, k) in function of the bidder’s number i = 1, . . . 30
and round number k. The identities for some bidders are indicated.11 Moreover, we identify the
median retirement bid for the informed bidder which was evaluated at round 18 out of 30. We
observe that, for all agents, the median informed bidder premium is positive until the informed
bidder retires from the bidding process. Specifically,
Claim 1 Bidding is more agressive when the informed bidder is actively participating in the
auction.
For high-value bidders remaining after I has left, the premia is negative and becomes neg-
ligible as we approach the end of the process; for median- and low-value bidders, the premium
is positive until they retire. Furthermore, the premium for the highest bidders are similar in
shape and decline in the intensity of the bids. In addition, for median- and low-value bidders,
the premia increases until they retire. Finally, the premia is largest for the lowest bids who
retire early on in the bidding process (located to the left of the graph).
These results are intuitively appealing. The fact that the informed bidder remains active
is interpreted as a good signal on the common value. Consequently, all the participants bid
11Recall that bids are re-sorted at each round in descending order. The bidder’s identity should be interpreted
as his position in the sorted bids. Hence, for example, bidder i = 17 at round k = 5 is the 17th highest bid of
the remaining N − k = 25 bidders.
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more aggressively than if he had not been present. However, when the informed bidder exits,
high-value bidders interpret this negatively and the bid is lower than it would have been oth-
erwise. Eventually, the information from the informed bidder’s decision is subsumed by the
new information as other bidders exit and the two bids become identical. The fact that the
informed bidder premium is highest for low-value-signal bidders is also intuitive. Since valua-
tion is the sum of a common and private value term, a low value on average corresponds to a
low private value. Since these agents comparatively value more the common component, any
information revealed by the informed bidder’s action is very valuable. The longer the informed
agent remains in the bidding process, the more it confirms that the common value might be
high.
Next, in Figure 3, we consider comparative statics exercises where we successively change
the assumptions generating the fixed parameters. For this analysis we focus exclusively on
the maximum bid. Since bids are ordered in descending order, this correspond to π(1, k, j) ≡
b1(1, k, j) − b0(1, k, j).
First, in panel A we increase a¯i → 5 × a¯i,∀i. This implies that the mean private value
component of total value becomes more important relative to the common value, and that
mean total value and signal are also higher. Conversely, the variances of both value and signal
remain unaffected. The impact is to shift outwards the informed bidder premium which becomes
more important. Second, in panel B we increase m→ 5×m. This results in an increase in the
mean common value, with variances again unaffected. This variable has no apparent impact on
our benchmark results. An increase in a¯i raises the mean levels of high-value bidders more than
those of low-value bidders. In comparison, an increase in m has a uniform effect on all bidders’
mean valuation. Consequently, the effect on the highest value bidder is more important than
in the second case.
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Third, in panel C, we increase ti → 2× ti,∀i thereby increasing the variance of the private
component of total value, and signal, while means remain unchanged. This results in lowering
the premium, which nonetheless remains positive. Bidders become more uncertain regarding
the informed bidder’s private value; the latter could remain active because of a large private
value which is irrelevant to other bidders, i.e. the winner’s curse risk is more important. Fourth,
in panel D we increase r0 → 2× r0. This raises the standard error on the common value. This
also has a positive impact on the premium since agents are more uncertain concerning the mean
common value. Any signal inferred from the informed bidder’s action is therefore more valuable.
Fifth, in panel E we increase si → 2×si,∀i so as to increase the overall variance of the signals
on common value without affecting the means. This implies that the signals agents receive
becomes less informative. Consequently the information revealed by the informed bidder’s
decision become more important and the premium increases strongly. Finally, in panel F we
increase N → 1.5N . Augmenting the number of participants from 30 to 45 shifts the informed
bidder outwards. It might have been argued that the informed bidder effect could have been
diluted by having more bidders. Our results show that this is not the case.
Overall, our Monte–Carlo results convey the following message. As long as the informed
bidder I remains active, the informed bidder premium is positive, i.e. all active bidders bid more
aggressively than otherwise. This result comes about from the interaction of the winner’s and
loser’s curse. The fact that I remains active could be because of a high common value. Then,
an outsider retiring from the auction incurs a loser’s curse. However, I could remain active
because of a high private value; remaining active therefore implies a winner’s curse risk. Our
results indicate that for a wide set of parametric specifications, the loser’s curse effect is more
important, such that bidders are willing to bid more aggressively knowing that the informed
bidder remains active.
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A corollary of this observation is that, if I remains active until the end, then the (N − 1)th
bidder will also bid more aggressively and I will end up paying a higher price. To verify this
claim, we therefore compute the informed bidder premium conditional on I winning the auction,
i.e. π(i = I, k = N, j).12 This corresponds to the difference in price the informed bidder would
have to pay given that he ended up winning the auction. Figure 4 plots the distribution of
premia. It clearly indicates that the premium is on average positive, with a median of 0.0984.
This last observation forms the basis of our empirical tests. We may state our main hypothesis
to be tested as follows:
Claim 2 The winning bid is higher when the informed bidder wins the auction.
In the subsequent econometric analysis, we formally test Claim 2 using our Mauritian slave
auctions data discussed in Section 2.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Methodology
Let ws denote whether winner of the auction for slave s is related (ws = 1), or not (ws = 0).
We are interested in testing if ws has some predicting power for the winning bid ps ≡ log(Ps).
13
If f denotes some probability function and Xs a vector of exogenous variables which explain
the winning bid, then we say there is no residual information asymmetry if ws has no prediction
power for ps:
f (ps |Xs, ws) = f(ps |Xs). (10)
12In our Monte-Carlo experiment, the informed bidder won the auction 395 times out of 5,000 replications.
13Note that the notarial acts document the winner of the auction but not the sequence of bids.
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Assuming a simple hedonic price function we have that:
ps =Xsβ + ws γ + εs. (11)
where β and γ are parameters, and εs is an error term. A test of the null hypothesis of no
residual adverse selection is then simply a test of H0 : γ = 0.
However, ws is potentially correlated with the unobservable characteristics of the slave, and
ordinary least square estimates of the parameters in (11) could be biased. One approach is to
find a valid instrument for ws which is not correlated with the error term εs. Letting Zs denote
the vector of explanatory variables which determine whether the winner of the auction s is a
related buyer and νs a mean-zero normally distributed random error term, we have that:
ws =


1 if νs > −Zsθ
0 if νs < −Zsθ
(12)
In other words, a related buyer wins the auction if there are net positive benefits for him or her.
The vector of explanatory variables Zs must contain at least one identifying variable which
is correlated with ws but is not correlated with the error term in (11). Assume the winning bid
should reflect the expected lifetime productivity of the slave. In this case, variables which do
not measure the slave’s productivity and which appear in the notarial act should not influence
the value of the winning bid. One such candidate identifying variable is the number of heirs:
ceteris paribus observing more or less heirs should not affect a slave’s productivity. However, if
there are more heirs, there are reasons to believe that one of them would be willing, or have the
financial means, to buy the slave. As a result we use the number of heirs to identify whether
the winner of the bid is a related buyer.
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For robustness reasons we extend the tests for residual information asymmetry proposed
by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) in the context of insurance markets.
While these tests are for either moral hazard or adverse selection, our results have a pure adverse
selection interpretation since the private action of a participant to the auction does not matter.
An adaptation of the Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) test means we have to simultaneously
estimate (12) and
ps = Xsβ + ηs. (13)
A correlation between ws and ps given, Xs, is equivalent to νs and ηs being correlated.
Dionne et al. (2001) point out that (10) is equivalent to:
f (ws, ps |Xs) = f (ws |Xs) f (ps |Xs) . (14)
This additional relationship shows the symmetry in ws and ps of the conditional independence
in our context. In a parametric formulation of winning auction prices distribution, as given
by (11), the conditional independence between ws and ps given Xs, is obtained when γ = 0
in (11). However, the null hypothesis of no residual information asymmetry can be rejected
because (11) is misspecified. Dionne et al. (2001) show that one way to avoid this problem is
to add the conditional expectation of ws as an explanatory variable in (11). In our case, using
(11) this means we should estimate:
ps =Xsβ +wsγ + E(ws|Zs)δ + εs, (15)
where E is expectation operator and δ is a parameter. Again, a test of the null hypothesis of
no adverse selection can be devised as a test for H0 : γ = 0.
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The control variables in Xs that we include are mainly determined by the availability of
the data, existing literature, and likely relevance. They can be separated between slave–specific
characteristics, sale–specific components, and timing elements:
• Slave–specific characteristics:
– Age: We expect the usual concave relationship between age and prices that is well
documented in the literature;
– Gender: As shown in the primary statistics, there appears to be a significant premium
for male slaves;
– Ethnicity: Chenny et al. (2003) showed that the ethnicity of the slave had a strong
influence on prices, most likely through its impact on resistance to illness, physical
strength, . . . ;
– Occupation: As a sizeable share of slaves were employed in skilled work, we expect
a premium on this variable;
• Sale–specific characteristics:
– Presence of children: Children, who under Code Noir had to be sold with their
mother, should increase the price. As found by Chenny et al. (2003), we expect a
different impact depending on the age of children involved.
• Timing elements:
– Years: As can be see in Figure 5, prices displayed considerable medium-term move-
ments across years, peaking at about 1830. We plan to capture those movements
through time dummies.
– Semesters: As most slaves were involved in agricultural activities, a strong seasonal
component to slave demand is expected.
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4.2 Results
The results of the multivariate tests for information asymmetry are reported in Table 7. For the
sake of comparison with the literature we start with the OLS estimates of the price equation
without conditioning on the information of the buyer. We then augment that equation with a
dummy variable which captures the identity of the buyer (related or unrelated).
As discussed in Section 4.1, observing that a related individual is the buyer is likely correlated
with the unobserved characteristics of the slave. Indeed, the Durbin-Wu-Haussman test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that the related buyer is exogenous with value of 10.76 and a p-value
of 0.001. We therefore estimate the price equation by two–stage least squares (2SLS) where
the number of heirs is used as the instrument. Once again, a related buyer pays a significantly
positive premium. However, given that relatedness between the buyer and the seller is measured
by a dummy variable, it may be inappropriate to use 2SLS. We therefore estimate the system
of equation by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) without any qualitative change in
the results. Both sets of estimates strongly reject the hypothesis that related buyers pay the
same price as unrelated ones.
The tests drawn from Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) also support
residual adverse selection on that market. The correlation of the residuals between the error
term of the probit equation for whether the buyer is related or unrelated and the error term
of the price equation equals 0.098 with a p-value of 0.001. The results obtained by using the
specification advocated by Dionne et al. (2001), equation (15), which are reported in the last
column of Table 7 (DGV), indicate that related buyers (insiders) pay a statistically significant
premium compared to unrelated ones. Hence, all the tests strongly reject the null hypothesis
that a related buyer does not pay a premium when buying a slave. In other words, a related
buyer with superior information leads to higher equilibrium prices, consistent with Claim 2.
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It is of interest to note that the other determinants of the price of a slave are consistent with
the literature. First we find the usual concave relation between age and price. A slave reached
its highest price at age 24.4, which is very close to the estimates reported in the literature for
the U.S. Kotlikoff (1979) and Peru Newland and San Segundo (1996). Second, a male slave
fetched a premium of 10% compared to a female one. This estimate confirms findings that
Mauritian female slaves were sold at a discount, reflecting lower labor productivity rather than
reproductive potential (Scarr, 1998, p. 161). Interestingly, our estimated male premium is the
same as the one found for the Southern US Kotlikoff (1979), very close to that for Jamaica (12%
in 1817, (Higman, 1976, p. 192)), and close to the lower estimates for the West Indies (10% to
25%, (Ward, 1988, fn. 60, p. 34)).
Our estimates also confirm that children purchased with their mother were highly valued.
Kotlikoff (1979) also finds that slave bundle prices increase with the age of children for the New
Orleans market. Low birth rates, and high mortality at birth (Benedict, 1980; Valentine, 2000)
are possible explanations of this high child premium. Moreover, the premium for children who
are older than five is higher than for those who are at most five. This difference may reflect
the high mortality rates of younger children and output lost when a female care for a young
infant (Barker, 1996, p. 95). Finally, human capital was valued positively: skilled slaves fetched
a premium of 17% compared to agricultural slaves and of 13% compared to household slaves.
These premia are lower than US and Peru ones, but similar to those for Cuban slaves.14
5 Conclusion
Existing tests for adverse selection in the market for slaves remain inconclusive. To re–address
this question, we took advantage of unique information in the notarial acts which document
14Kotlikoff (1979) for the US and Newland and San Segundo (1996) for Peru find a skill premium varying
between 43 and 46%. (Bergad et al., 1995, pp. 72–77) report that a 1819 Cuban field hand sold for 467 Spanish
pesos, whereas a carpenter sold for 525.
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the auction sales of slaves on the secondary market in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835. We
used the fact that buyers and sellers were often related to test the presence of adverse selection.
Such buyers would likely have had privileged information about unobservable characteristics
of the slave correlated with its common value. Moreover, given that the size of the Mauritian
slave market was relatively small, it was likely that the identity of related bidders was known
by other bidders.
Under these two assumptions of informational asymmetry and public identities, we used
a benchmark auction–theoretic model of English auctions that is well–adapted to our setting.
This model predicted more aggressive bidding by all participants as long as a related bidder
remained active in the auction. Importantly, the model predicted that the related bidder would
have ended up paying a higher price in instances where he would win the auction.
We tested this conjecture controlling for slave characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, occupa-
tion), as well as timing. Addressing potential nonlinearities, endogeneity and bounded variable
issues, our result consistently validate the model’s prediction. Drawing from the empirical
adverse selection literature in insurance markets only confirmed these results.
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Appendix
A Closed-form equilibrium bids
For completeness, we reproduce the closed-form expressions for the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
bids from Hong and Shum (2003). The distributional assumptions governing value and signals
can be written as: 

vi
x

 ∼ N.I.D.




µi
µ∗

 ,


σ2i σ
∗′
i
σ∗i Σ
∗



 (16)
where x is the N × 1 signal vector, with:
• xkr is the (N−k)×1 vector of unobserved signals after k bids have occurred and k bidders
have exited, and xkd is the k × 1 vector of observed signals;
• Σ∗−1k,1 is the (N − k) ×N partition of the inverse of the covariance matrix in (16) corre-
sponding to the N − k remaining bidders. Σ∗−1k,2 is the k ×N partition corresponding to
the k bidders who have exited;
• lk is the N − k unit vector, µk ≡ (u1, . . . uN−k)
′, Γk ≡ (σ
2
1 , . . . σ
2
N−k)
′, and Λk ≡
(σ∗1, . . .σ
∗
N−k).
Define:
Ak ≡ (ΛkΣ
∗−1
k,1 )
−1lk; (17)
Ck ≡ 1/2(ΛkΣ
∗−1
k,1 )
−1(Γk −Diag(ΛkΣ
∗−1Λ′k) + 2µk − 2ΛkΣ
∗−1µ∗); (18)
Dk ≡ (ΛkΣ
∗−1
k,1 )
−1(ΛkΣ
∗−1
k,2 ). (19)
Take the ith row of each and substitute in (6) to obtain the optimal bids.
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Figure 1: Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2004) example
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Figure 2: Median Informed Bidder Premium
Note: Each line corresponds to the median informed bidder premiumMedian(π(i, k, :
)), where π(i, k, j) is given in (9), and the premium is calculated for each agent
i = 1, . . . , 30, and at each round k. The thick line corresponds to the maximum bid
i = 1 and defines our benchmark case used in the subsequent comparative robustness
analysis.
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Figure 3: Median Informed Bidder Premium: Effects of Parameters
Note: The median informed bidder premium is Median(π(i, k, :)), where π(i, k, j)
is given in (9), and the premium is calculated for the maximum bid i = 1, and at
each round k. The solid line corresponds to our benchmark specification while the
dashed line varies one parameter in turn.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Informed Bidder Premium Conditional on I winning the Auction
Note: The informed bidder premium is π(i, k, j) given in (9). It is calculated condi-
tional on the informed bidder winning the auction, i.e. i = I, when k = N .
40
1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835
100
200
300
400
500
600
date
Pr
ic
e
0
50
100
150
200
250
Qu
an
titi
es
Price
slaves sold
Figure 5: Average quarterly slave prices, quantity sold, Mauritius 1825–1835
Note: Solid line is mean quarterly slave prices (left-hand scale). Dashed line is
number of slaves sold during public auctions (right-hand scale).
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C Tables
Table 1: Distribution of sales by notaries
Archive Nb. of auctions Nb. of slaves sold
Num. Notary District Active 25-29 30-35 25-35 25-29 30-35 25-35
NA 42 TOUSSAINT Grand Port 1791-1831 13 13 125 125
NA 63 DUBOR, Louis-Joseph Senoni Port Louis 1819-1830 37 3 40 269 34 303
NA 66 MONTOCCHIO, Jean Charles Flacq 1822-1874 10 6 16 140 78 218
NA 67 JOLLIVET, Yves Isidore Port-Louis 1822-1857 35 43 78 183 511 694
NA 68 BUSSIE´, Jean-Paul Port-Louis 1823-1832 38 24 62 221 182 403
NA 69 ARNAUD, Charles Port-Louis 1823-1833 24 8 32 444 129 573
NA 71 BELIN, Jean Port-Louis 1824-1827 5 5 33 33
NA 72 BONNEFIN, Alexandre Port-Louis 1825-1833 110 41 151 703 142 845
NA 73 BONSERGENT, The´odore Port-Louis 1825-1828 17 17 43 43
NA 74 DEROULLEDE, L. E. Port-Louis 1828-1837 12 33 45 141 148 289
NA 75 GIBLOT-DUCRAY, J. M. R. See note 1 1829-1873 1 14 15 29 85 114
NA 76 MAIGNARD, Louis Charlemagne Port Louis 1830-1839 34 34 197 197
NA 77 ERNY, Ame´de´e See note 2 1831-1837 24 24 271 271
NA 78 BOUIC, Jules Port Louis 1833-1839 41 41 151 151
NA 79 TREBUCHET, Louis Antoine Port Louis 1833-1842 7 7 27 27
Total 302 278 580 2,331 1,955 4,286
Notes
NA Notary Archive number refers to the classification used at the Mauritius Archives.
1. Giblot-Ducray was based in Pamplemousses & Rivie`re du Rempart from 1829 to 1831 and then in
Grand Port & Savanne between 1832 and 1842. He remained active until 1873 but the district after
1842 is not documented
2. Erny was based in Pamplemousses & Rivie`re du Rempart in 1831 and 1832. He then moved to Port
Louis
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Table 2: Comparison with the 1826 partial census
Number of slaves Average age
1826 Census Notarial acts 1826 Census Notarial Acts
Nb. % Nb. % Avg. Std. Dev. Avg. Std. Dev.
All sample 20,467 4,013 25 14.3 28 15.0
Gender
Male 11,671 57 2,724 64 26 14.0 30 14.5
Female 8,762 43 1,521 36 23 14.5 24 15.2
Missing 33
Ethnic group
Creole 10,364 51 2,015 52 17 12.1 19 12.9
Mozambique 5,581 28 995 26 34 10.8 38 9.7
Malagasy 3,666 18 717 19 31 11.3 34 9.9
Indian 669 3 135 3 44 12.6 47 10.4
Missing 424
Note: See Valentine (2000) for a description of the partial 1826 census.
Table 3: Occupation and Ethnicity. Individual slave sales
1825 - 1835 Ethnic group All ethnic
Gender Occupation Creole Mozambique Malagasy Indian Unknown groups
Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num.
Female Skilled 108 2 229 8 106 1 196 11
Laborer 378 64 188 49 298 19 109 13 126 5 274 150
Household 345 203 243 36 354 63 197 23 313 20 325 345
Unknown 246 69 149 17 216 16 111 11 219 14 214 127
All 330 338 201 102 313 106 152 48 255 39 288 633
Male Skilled 427 167 349 155 371 152 131 10 411 59 382 543
Laborer 397 196 298 495 315 237 194 22 238 25 318 975
Household 373 210 305 65 405 71 188 33 311 17 350 396
Unknown 305 70 271 93 310 47 261 12 314 58 294 280
All 387 643 305 808 344 507 193 77 337 159 337 2,194
All Skilled 423 169 349 155 364 160 128 11 411 59 378 554
Laborer 392 260 289 544 314 256 163 35 219 30 313 1,125
Household 360 413 283 101 381 134 191 56 312 37 338 741
Unknown 276 139 252 110 286 63 189 23 295 72 269 407
All 367 981 294 910 339 613 177 125 321 198 326 2,827
Notes Average prices are in current piastres (5 piastres = £1 = $4.94US in 1827, Officer (2001)). The sample
is restricted to individual slaves whose gender is known. We exclude heterogenous groups and mother-child
bundles. The following occupations are recorded in the notarial acts are:
• Skilled slaves: Assistant blacksmith, blacksmith, barrel maker, carpenter, carpentry trainee, carter,
commander, locksmith, mason, master carpenter, master mason, mattress maker, nailer, roofer, sack-
maker, sawyer, shoemaker, squarer, stone cutter, stone cutter trainee, sugar-maker.
• Agriculture slaves: Chief gardener, gardener, laborer, marketman, stable-boy, watchman and sea-
related activities: caulker, fisherman, sailor.
• Household slaves: Baker, cook, innkeeper, laundress, maid, messenger, nurse, seamstress, shoe pol-
isher, tailor.
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Table 4: Motivations for the sales
Reasons for the aution
Year Voluntary Bankruptcy Succession Unknown All
1825 9 1 42 1 53
1826 9 37 1 47
1827 6 1 45 3 55
1828 57 11 66
1829 65 14 76
1830 2 41 1 42
1831 1 46 8 55
1832 35 7 41
1833 6 5 29 3 43
1834 19 10 36 15 80
1835 2 3 8 1 14
1825-35 51 23 441 65 572
Year Number of slaves sold by reason
1825 118 51 377 4 550
1826 58 309 6 373
1827 37 28 349 3 417
1828 459 66 525
1829 410 56 466
1830 3 234 53 290
1831 7 454 33 494
1832 168 24 192
1833 12 155 228 43 438
1834 53 124 226 96 499
1835 7 14 17 4 42
1825-35 256 382 3,231 388 4,286
Note Unknown means either the reason is not documented or the condition of the notarial
act did not allow us to identify the reason for the sale.
Table 5: Differences in slave prices, succession vs voluntary sales
Succession & voluntary sales Succession sales Voluntary sales T-test Premium
Avg. price Nb. of obs Avg. price Nb. of obs
All males
1825-1835 355 1,598 247 146 9.22 44%
1825-1830 400 1,080 267 117 9.81 50%
1831-1835 259 518 163 29 5.90 59%
Prime-aged field slaves 334 687 231 61 6.58 45%
Note: A prime-aged field slave is a male of age 15 to 35 who works in agriculture (pioche or other agricultural
related tasks). Price is in piastres. The T-test is for the null hypothesis that prices for related and unrelated
buyers (top panel), succession and voluntary sales (bottom panel), are equal.
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Table 6: Related and Unrelated Buyers
Reasons for the sale
Link between the Voluntary Bankruptcy Sucession Unknown Total Share
owner and the buyer
Family 25.7%
Wife 286 286
Husband 9 189 191
Son 1 177 178
Son in law 1 76 77
Daughter 69 69
Grand children 9 9
Nephew and niece 9 9
Brother 3 5 8
Father 8 8
Sister 7 7
Brother in law 2 2
Cousin 2 2
Minor children 2 2
Father in law 1 1
Mother 1 1
Buy back 1.0%
Original slave owner 14 7 7 28
The slave 2 4 6
0.3%
Tenant 3 3
Business partner 7 7
3.3%
Same last name 3 3 97 2 105
Other 4 4
69.7%
No apparent link 200 314 1,530 260 2,304
Total 221 329 2,488 3,307
Notes
∗ Children sold with their mother are coded as one sale because they could not be sold,
or bought, separately. We exclude group sales of slaves, i.e. heterogenous bundling of
adult slaves.
∗∗ Other informed buyers include: a creditor, husband of the niece of the deceased, the
notary, the testament executor (fonde´ des pouvoirs)
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Table 7: Determinants of slave prices: Succession sales only
OLS 2SLS FIML DGV
Log of price log price Buyer log price Buyer log price
Related buyer 0.056** 0.617** 0.373*** 0.064**
2.41 2.354 3.784 2.27
Exp. value of the informed dummy 0.594***
2.93
Number of heirs 0.022*** 0.072***
4.329 5.164
Attributes
Age 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.056*** -0.012** 0.053*** -0.035** 0.056***
10.931 11.139 7.885 2.196 9.071 2.262 6.725
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000* -0.001*** 0.000* -0.001***
16.731 16.836 11.617 1.791 13.34 1.83 8.776
Male slave 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.096** 0.013 0.097*** 0.04 0.096**
3.353 3.378 2.385 0.383 2.676 0.414 2.437
Handicapped -0.537*** -0.538*** -1.036*** -0.305 -1.112*** -5.808
4.421 4.436 2.639 0.908 3.18 0
Ethnicity
Mozambique -0.058* -0.067** -0.124** 0.148*** -0.088** 0.443*** -0.130**
1.852 2.126 2.053 3.639 1.975 3.866 2.345
Malagasy -0.041 -0.045 -0.076* 0.053 -0.066 0.153 -0.078**
1.39 1.506 1.667 1.374 1.628 1.39 2.06
Indian -0.413*** -0.421*** -0.412*** 0.08 -0.396*** 0.223 -0.414***
7.006 7.048 4.781 1.086 5.153 1.083 4.037
Mother-child bundling
Num. of children not older than 5 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.269*** -0.048 0.257*** -0.136 0.272***
8.217 8.218 5.483 1.157 5.95 1.136 6.789
Num. of children older than 5 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.356*** 0.034 0.362*** 0.086 0.355***
9.044 9.039 5.567 0.613 6.286 0.552 6.112
Occupation
Laborer and agriculture -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.121** -0.099** -0.143*** -0.283** -0.114**
5.98 5.82 2.256 2.36 3.225 2.417 2.421
Household -0.133*** -0.142*** -0.152** 0.108** -0.124** 0.297** -0.155***
3.802 4.031 2.493 2.33 2.51 2.305 2.806
1826 0.054 0.046 0.045 0.011 0.047 0.074 0.036
1.117 0.951 0.614 0.179 0.704 0.395 0.523
1827 0.380*** 0.375*** 0.242*** 0.126** 0.269*** 0.408** 0.234***
8.536 8.443 3.21 2.055 4.194 2.369 4.031
1828 0.731*** 0.708*** 0.649*** 0.121** 0.680*** 0.375** 0.639***
17.806 16.758 8.952 2.151 11.385 2.309 10.678
1829 0.842*** 0.828*** 0.790*** 0.076 0.820*** 0.251 0.779***
20.118 19.668 11.088 1.349 14.006 1.557 13.536
1830 0.587*** 0.578*** 0.549*** 0.106 0.580*** 0.32 0.538***
11.117 10.9 6.163 1.452 7.611 1.547 7.803
1831 0.313*** 0.290*** 0.195** 0.215*** 0.251*** 0.622*** 0.179**
7.735 7.012 2.277 4.008 4.187 4.003 2.457
1832 0.04 0.021 0.056 -0.002 0.062 0.105 0.05
0.73 0.368 0.668 0.026 0.817 0.507 0.49
1833 -0.159*** -0.163*** -0.099 -0.170** -0.133* -0.563** -0.099
2.839 2.899 1.074 2.28 1.705 2.39 1.137
1834 -0.191*** -0.211*** -0.314*** 0.200** -0.251*** 0.569** -0.327***
2.792 3.068 2.7 2.39 2.806 2.43 3.174
2nd Quarter -0.072* -0.068* -0.045 -0.065 -0.061 -0.134 -0.048
1.961 1.848 0.785 1.355 1.202 0.976 0.978
3rd Quarter -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.044 -0.009 -0.078 0.004
0.143 0.083 0.112 0.977 0.19 0.613 0.088
4th Quarter 0.034 0.029 -0.004 0.04 0.005 0.136 -0.008
1.072 0.908 0.082 0.941 0.113 1.146 0.178
Constant 5.120*** 5.090*** 4.787*** 0.390*** 4.905*** -0.393 4.772***
59.286 58.323 26.751 3.462 39.539 1.249 28.305
Number of observations 1812 1797 1212 1212 1212 1210
R-squared 0.579 0.58 0.421 0.097
Notes Related buyer is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the buyer and the orignal slave owner are related,
and zero otherwise (see Table 4). The reference categories are: skilled workers for occupation (see Table 3
for the full list of occupations); creoles for ethnicity, 1825 for the year and the first quarter for semester.
We use only succession sales from 1825 to 1834 in estimating the model. The lack of data prevents us from
using sales for 1835.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-Squared statistic for the null hypothesis that Buyer is informed is exogenous
equals 10.76 and the corresponding P-Value is 0.001. Absolute value of T-ratios corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity are reported under the point estimate; * denotes the parameter is significantly different from zero at
10%; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
DGV denotes the specification based on Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse 2001
